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Criticality, Experimentation and  
Complicity in the LA Review of  Books ’  




In order to understand the way in which criticality appears as a 
concept, it is instructive to look at its deployment in policing the 
boundaries of disciplines. Here I examine a controversy that began in 
mid-2016, in which the boundary of the humanities (as a general 
disciplinary grouping of research activity) in general was drawn against 
Digital Humanities as a subdiscipline, on the grounds of its complicity 
in the neoliberal economics of the university and the alleged failure of 
its function as a ‘critical’ discipline. 
The Digital Humanities controversy started with an article by 
Daniel Allington, Sarah Brouillette and David Golumbia in the LA 
Review of Books in May 2016.1 The authors set out a polemic which 
strongly critiqued the place of Digital Humanities in academia. While 
the polemic is instructive, and in some respects serves to caution 
against enthusiastic alignment with market forces in the university, it is 
the nature of the response to their polemic (from both supporters and 
opponents of their argument) that I focus on here. That response is 
particularly interesting in helping us to understand how the idea of 
criticality is shaped in the interests of an assemblage of interrelated 
concepts: disciplinarity, morality and complicity. The authors make 
three key charges against Digital Humanities.  
Firstly, they call it the exemplary neoliberal discipline, in that it 
accelerates tendencies towards neoliberal working conditions already 
present in the academy: insecure, project-based and ‘alt-academic’ 
work presented as the product of empowering career choices, and the 
redefinition of technical expertise as ‘the superior form’ of humanist 
                                                
1 Daniel Allington, Sarah Brouillette and David Golumbia, ‘Neoliberal Tools (And 
Archives): A Political History of Digital Humanities’, LA Review of Books, May 1, 2016, 
accessed June 14, 2016, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/neoliberal-tools-archives-
political-history-digital-humanities/, 
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knowledge. 2  The discipline also allows these tendencies to be 
extended into spaces of the academy that were previously immune to 
it, namely the bastions of ‘individual scholarship’ in the humanities. 
Secondly, they argue that from its inception as a subdiscipline of 
textual studies, Digital Humanities has always been part of a general 
movement opposed to interpretation. They say: 
 
Digital Humanities has often tended to be anti-interpretive, 
especially when interpretation is understood as a political 
activity. Digital Humanities instead aims to archive materials, 
produce data, and develop software, while bracketing off the 
work of interpretation to a later moment or leaving it to other 
scholars – or abandoning it altogether for those who argue that 
we ought to become ‘postcritical’.3 
 
And as a corollary to that, Digital Humanities tends to bracket off 
questions of identity and politics more generally. ‘What it stands in 
opposition to, rather, is the insistence that academic work should be critical, 
and that there is, after all, no work and no way to be in the world that 
is not political.’4 
Given these failures, the authors finally argue that in the Digital 
Humanities ‘[p]urported technical expertise trumps all other forms of 
knowledge’.5 Even where the impulse exists to do better – which for 
the authors can only mean to avoid reproducing the neoliberal 
university – the lure of funding and the pressure from managers will 
force researchers to push on and those neoliberal conditions are 
reached anyway. 
At the end of the article the authors stop short of calling for 
disengagement, but they conclude that the success of the discipline is 
entirely premised on its complicity with a neoliberal agenda: ‘a 
consequence of its constitution, from the outset, as precisely such a 
recapitulation’ to the values of Silicon Valley startup culture.6 If its 
premises are accepted, the critique has to be taken as damning the 
                                                
2 Allington, Brouillette and Golumbia, ‘Neoliberal Tools (And Archives)’. 
3 Allington, Brouillette and Golumbia, ‘Neoliberal Tools (And Archives)’. 
4 Allington, Brouillette and Golumbia, ‘Neoliberal Tools (And Archives)’. Emphasis in 
original. 
5 Allington, Brouillette and Golumbia, ‘Neoliberal Tools (And Archives)’. 
6 Allington, Brouillette and Golumbia, ‘Neoliberal Tools (And Archives)’. 
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Digital Humanities to the scrapheap. Given the three charges (being 
the acceleration of neoliberalisation of the institution, the bracketing 
of the interpretive and the political, and especially that Digital 
Humanities by its very nature wills the neoliberalisation of the 
academy through the primacy of the technical), it seems difficult to 
come to any kind of compromise. By implication, this polemic is a call 
for a moral stance against Digital Humanities by any academic who 
wishes to call themselves ‘critical’. 
I don’t want to attempt an answer to the question of whether 
Allington, Brouillette and Golumbia are right in implicitly calling for 
such a stance. Since the initial controversy in 2016, a large number of 
respondents have taken them to task for saying so; for example, Brian 
Greenspan sensitively addresses the ‘“ressentiment” implicit in the 
article while recognising the important role that digital humanities 
serves in “scandalously reveal[ing] the system’s components.”’7 I don’t 
think that such a call (to disengage from the types of research included 
in the Digital Humanities, or conversely to endorse them) would make 
sense in light of my earlier question: under what conditions can we 
call thought ‘critical’, and what does the defining of thought as critical 
actually do? 
Broadly, there have been two types of response to the polemic. 
The first is those that only engage with the idea of Digital Humanities 
as a critical discipline narrowly bounded by a moralistic definition of 
criticality – and end up arguing that Digital Humanities is a ‘good’ 
discipline, because of the content of the work that it produces.8 The 
counterpart to this response is that the addition of technical tools and 
software and data to humanities research is good, in that it permits 
critique, again on the level of content. Equally, some suggest that in 
response to the material effect (and, arguably, cause) of the ‘problem’ 
of Digital Humanities – the acceleration of neoliberalism in the 
academy – we should take an accelerationist approach. After all, we 
                                                
7 Brian Greenspan, ‘The Scandal of Digital Humanities’, Carlton Hyperlab blog, January 23, 
2018, accessed June 4, 2018, https://carleton.ca/hyperlab/2018/the-scandal-of-digital-
humanities/. 
8 Alan Liu,  ‘Drafts for Against the Cultural Singularity’ (book in process), Alan Liu 
Institutional homepage, May 2, 2016, accessed November 13, 2016, 
http://liu.english.ucsb.edu/drafts-for-against-the-cultural-singularity/. 
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can’t defeat neoliberalism with interpretation (says Alan Jacobs), so we 
may as well enthusiastically engage with its effects.9 
The responses that I find more productive are those that do not 
dead-end in a narrow definition of critique, but rather break down the 
dichotomies that the authors of the LARB piece establish: support 
staff versus researchers, critical-interpretive work versus corporate 
startup culture, the solo researcher versus the lab. (I should note at 
this point that Alice Corble’s contribution to the LCCT roundtable 
discussion addressed this very question in more detail than I could do 
justice to here). Stewart Varner, among others, has argued that the 
distinction between support staff and researchers is nowhere near as 
clear cut in this field as is made out. Quoting Laurie Allen, he argues 
that outside of the specific case of Digital Humanities, ‘[h]umanities 
scholarship has always been dependent on “huge amounts of hidden 
and unpaid or unacknowledged labor” from students, research 
assistants, contingent faculty, librarians, archivists and others’. 10 
Equally, Jacobs highlights the ‘long history’ of critical and scholarly 
work carried out under the aegis of corporate funding – Claude 
Shannon’s long employment by IBM is his prime example, suggesting 
that linking criticality to moral purity would expel us all from the 
category.11 
So what is really happening in this critique of Digital 
Humanities? One factor is, obviously, a policing of discipline through 
a concept of criticality understood as a moral category grounded in 
the interpretive or hermeneutic tradition of literary studies. There is 
also a genuine attempt to offer some reaction to the neoliberalisation 
of the academy, but in doing so the authors create a scapegoat in 
Digital Humanities that privileges a narrow and fairly conservative 
idea of the conditions under which critical work can be produced.  
                                                
9 Alan Jacobs, ‘Critiquing the Critique of Digital Humanities’, The New Atlantis blog, May 
2, 2016, accessed November 13, 2016, http://text-
patterns.thenewatlantis.com/2016/05/critiquing-critique-of-digital.html. 
10 Stewart Varner, ‘A few thoughts on the whole DH, neoliberalism, LARB thing’, 
stewartvarner.com,  May 6, 2016, accessed June 1, 2016, 
https://stewartvarner.com/2016/05/06/a-few-thoughts-on-the-whole-dh-neoliberalism-
larb-thing/ (Varner is partially quoting Laurie Allen here). 
11 Shannon was employed by IBM as a researcher when he produced his groundbreaking 
communications theory. See Wendy Chun, Programmed Visions: Software and Memory (London: 
The MIT Press, 2011). 
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Alan Liu, whose own fraternal critique of Digital Humanities is 
quoted in the LARB article, has rightly pointed out that the concept 
of critique deployed here is aimed at shutting out other forms of work 
which might be thought of as critical even if they do not resemble the 
kind of interpretive, hermeneutic approach that the authors prefer. He 
suggests Digital Humanities could enact a form of critique through 
infrastructure as a possible alternative: he turns to social 
constructivism and neoinstitutionalism from sociology and 
information science, to create a ‘portfolio’ of methods that together 
form a ‘weak antifoundationalism’.12 He says, 
 
Taken together, these approaches explore how organizations are 
structured as social institutions by so-called ‘carriers’ of beliefs 
and practices (i.e., culture), among which information-technology 
infrastructure is increasingly crucial. 
 
This seems to me to be a fairly weak replacement for any kind of 
unbounded criticality, and one which doesn’t necessarily open up the 
terrain beyond the narrow terms of interpretive critique that the 
LARB authors seem to prefer. Indeed, he goes on to concede that 
compared to network studies or new media studies, Digital 
Humanities avoids ‘broader commentary directed externally at society 
and social justice.’13 
Perhaps the best afterword to the original controversy is one 
provided by David Golumbia himself in a 2017 blogpost. Addressing 
his critics, and engaging with what he considers to be their misreading 
of his argument, he suggests that the real issue with Digital 
Humanities isn’t simply that it takes funding away from the 
‘traditional’ humanities by deploying novel technologies in research. 
The problem is broader, and stems from the ‘alignment of the [Digital 
Humanities] project against what it falsely projects as ‘traditional’ 
academic practice.’ He argues that practitioners of Digital Humanities 
(with a few notable exceptions, including Liu) have no desire to 
maintain the humanities as they are, and as such accept the definition 
                                                
12 Liu, ‘Drafts for Against the Cultural Singularity’.  
13 Liu, ‘Drafts for Against the Cultural Singularity’.  
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of all humanities research (outside Digital Humanities) as ‘traditional’ 
and therefore as stale and replaceable by Digital Humanities.14 
By untethering the original critique from the question of 
technology, Golumbia’s argument becomes circular: ‘traditional’ 
humanities comes to stand for anything outside of Digital Humanities, 
and Digital Humanities is defined by its lack of interest in preserving 
anything outside itself. The dismissal of the humanities in general as 
traditional, he says, is what produces the possibility for Digital 
Humanities work to so routinely disregard the humanistic research 
Golumbia finds appealing. 
The way in which the original argument is modified is 
instructive. Although the target shifts (not the destructiveness of the 
tools used in digital humanities research, but the framing of the 
discipline itself), the terrain on which the debate plays out is still one 
which accepts the premise that good ‘critical’ research is humanistic 
and moral. The alliance between digital humanists and the financial 
engines of research is threatening to Golumbia because it represents 
the end of critical humanism as the basis of the critical. Golumbia 
quotes from Immanuel Wallerstein at length: ‘Historical capitalism has 
been, we know, Promethean in its aspirations’ and we should thus be 
suspicious of the Promethean nature of Digital Humanities.15 
Just as I do not want to propose a moral stance towards Digital 
Humanities as a proxy for a moral stance towards capitalism, I also 
don’t want to make a proposal for an alternative definition of 
criticality here. By way of opening this discussion back up to that 
general question – what are the conditions of production of criticality 
– I would point to an argument about method made by Jussi Parikka, 
and more broadly to the value of experimentation as it appears 
throughout Deleuze’s writing.16  
                                                
14 David Golumbia,  ‘The Destructiveness of the Digital Humanities (‘Traditional’ Part II)’ 
Uncomputing blog, June 5, 2017, https://www.uncomputing.org/?p=1868. 
15 David Golumbia, ‘The Destructiveness of the Digital Humanities’. 
16 As laid out in, for example, the plateau ‘Introduction to Schizoanalysis’: see Gilles 
Deleuze and Feliz Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 371, especially the footnote quoting John Cage: ‘The 
word experimental is apt, providing it is understood not as descriptive of an act to be later 
judged in terms of success and failure, but simply as of an act the outcome of which is 
unknown.’ 
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Discussing media labs and maker spaces (which we could 
probably take to be a particular flavour of Digital Humanities space, if 
we steer clear of the narrow definition that Allington, Brouillette and 
Golumbia employed), Parikka raises the idea that we need to think 
differently about the temporality of the emergence of such spaces. He 
argues that we should ask ‘[n]ot just what is a lab but why now?’17 The 
lab is a symptom, and as such we should think of it ‘not merely as an 
internal place of new methods or new forms of creative or academic 
activity but as a fold between such techniques and external political 
and economic conditions of current institutions’.18 This is in aid of 
making explicit the assemblage which engenders such spaces, without 
an over-reliance on fixing that definition – if we do so, we murder in 
order to dissect.19 
So, after Parikka, might we be able to ask not just ‘what is 
criticality?’, but: ‘why is criticality being invoked now, for this end, as 
the moral kernel to be protected from the neoliberal university?’ What 
if we instead thought of the concept of criticality as itself at stake in 
this folding of techniques and conditions? And as a corollary to that, 
in this particular context, why do the lines of the dichotomy 
‘critical/not critical’ appear to fall along the distinction between 
archive, data, software, image on the one hand and published matter – 
text – on the other? 
I would argue that this points to the limit of criticality as a 
concept – it is restricted by its pairing with complicity, as it is 
presented in the original LARB account. If your relationship to your 
subject (and by extension your discipline and the material 
infrastructure that supports it) should be critical, properly, and you 
engage with it ‘improperly’, you are complicit by default. But 
complicity needs to be analysed over criticality. The corollary question 
should be asked, then: What methods are available to us to escape the 
dichotomy? The way to find out is to experiment with the limits of 
what might be considered ‘critical’. 
                                                
17 Jussi Parikka, ‘The Lab as a Symptom’, Machinology blog, May 10, 2016, accessed June 
14, 2016, . 
18 Parikka, ‘The Lab as a Symptom’. 
19 See Claire Colebrook, ‘Time that is Intolerant’, in Memory in the Twenty-First Century: New 
Critical Perspectives from the Arts Humanities and Social Sciences, ed. Sebastian Groes (London: 
Palgrave, 2016), 153. 
